The Only Solution: Direct U.S Involement
The Only Solution: Direct U.S Involement
Nagorno-Karabagh's fate is not set in stone.
Behind the frozen status of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict lurks a massive disaster that could lead to a third world war. Questions blossom…
Does the US care about this conflict?
Is there a possible solution?
It is important to highlight the reason why the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is a matter of strategic concern for the United States. This conflict is among the lesser-known, overlooked, but most explosive conflicts that can be effectively resolved in the event that the international community approaches it with the utmost care, urgency, and with the consideration that minor actions today will amplify in time.
A large scale war has the potential of spiraling out of control quickly and with devastating consequences for the region. 2020 was the first eruption.
The incumbent superpower, the United States, has been unable to exert its influence adequately to address threats against its interests in the Caucasus region. As a result, the credibility of the United States in the Caucasus has subsided, especially with American unwillingness to intervene on behalf of its Georgian ally during the 2008 Russian invasion. In 2009, the U.S. failed to help normalize the Armenian-Turkish relations and has been unable to help Turkey become a European Union member. As a result, Russia, Iran, and Turkey have all contributed to undermining the influence of the United States in the region.
The fact that both the United States and Turkey are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and are supporting Azerbaijan against Russia and Iran as sponsors of Armenia, raises the stakes of a new potential conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh even higher. In addition, the oil-rich Caspian Sea basin has given Azerbaijan the economic leverage to manipulate regional players, adding another layer of complexity. Instead of focusing on resolving the conflict, the powers have used the frozen status of the conflict to advance their own national interests to gain a strategic foothold in the region, which means access to oil.
United States: Out of the Game?
The U.S. strategy in dealing with the Caucasus, specifically with the Nagorno-Karabagh, was initially unfocused. The United States was lethargic in dealing with the conflict and allowed Russia to dominate the stage, an opportunity Russia has enthusiastically seized. The U.S. has a seat in the Minsk group, but such a position has not increased U.S. relevance in the region. Quite the contrary, it has diminished U.S. prestige, causing great despair for Armenia and a level of confusion for Azerbaijan.
The U.S. primary interest in the South Caucasus is access to oil, freedom of action, and strategic maneuver from east to west. A secondary U.S. interest is to challenge the potential of Russian and Iranian hegemonic control in the Caucasus. Strategic alliances of the United States, however, have been challenged by the Russian-Iranian influence over Azerbaijan, Armenia, and now Turkey.
U.S. political and military leaders have realized that threatening Turkey is a strategic mistake that can have devastating strategic effects, resulting in the loss of military basing, energy resources, and a strong Muslim ally.
Turkey’s rise as a powerful nation in the region has inspired Turkish political leaders to seek out a greater role in world order with a vision that often outflanks the U.S.-Turkish partnership. Over time, the Turkish people have become cynical over the U.S. presence in the region and see the U.S. as an external agitator.
As the U.S. draws down its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the central powers on the continent are left to deal with the realities of the new regional order. Russia and Iran have strategically minimized the U.S. influence in the Caucasus by hindering the normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relationship and by debilitating the mediation process of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.
Russia and Iran have warned Azerbaijan and Georgia that the introduction of NATO forces or military bases in either country is unacceptable. But that did not stop Azerbejian or Georgia from allowing the US and Turkish military to control command operations. Armenia is dependent on Iranian and Russian energy resources. For Russia, Turkish-Armenian normalization is another NATO step towards the underbelly of the Russian Federation. The loss of Armenia to NATO can lead to the loss of Georgia and eventually Azerbaijan to the Western sphere of influence. For Iran, normalized relations between Turkey and Armenia will have both economic and security ramifications. Armenia is dependent on Iranian exports for consumer goods as well as energy resources so normalization with Turkey will disrupt Iranian markets.
For Russia, however, if normalized Turkish-Armenian relations are at the expense of the Turkish-Azeri relations this may strengthen Russo-Azeri cooperation which is one of Russia’s primary regional agendas. Russian and Turkish interests are at odds in relation to Azeri oil. Resolving the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations while supporting the Turkish-Azeri kinship will help the United States gain greater influence over Armenia and weaken Russia’s stronghold. Such a pursuit may require US military involvement in Nagorno-Karabagh with the commitment and will to confront Russia and Iran. Barring a strong U.S. diplomatic and if necessary, military involvement, the legitimacy of the United States as an influential player in the Caucasus region may continue to diminish.
Conflicting and Competing Issues
Today Russia, Iran, and Turkey manipulate politics and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict to effectively counterbalance and strengthen their strategic positions over the Caucasian region. Russia is on a quest to make Turkey and Iran economically dependent on itself, Turkey is attempting to use its relationship with Russia to secure its aim at creating a Ceyhan oil hub, while Iran is using Russia to counter Turkey’s domination in the region by denying a foothold for the Western nation. As each regional power competes over finite resources within the Caucasus region, the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict spirals downward as the warring parties continue to arm themselves with sophisticated military technology which can undoubtedly lead to war. Turkey, Iran, and Russia indisputably believe that their own military aptitude is supreme compared to the other. As Turkey dwindles away from the United States sphere of influence and continues to build its relationship with Russia and Iran, the strategic position of the United States in Turkey will weaken. War in the Caucasus will open a window of opportunities that will prove irresistible for regional powers to ignore especially if a military venture may result in expanding regional dominance and acquiring a significant share of resources. The following section will focus on recommendations and thoughts to help untangle the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, but more importantly for the United States and western nations, it will address ways to regain both legitimacy and the strategic advantage in the Caucasus region.
Recommendations for a U.S based solution.
1) Minsk Group: Same Structure, but Neutral Players
The OSCE Minsk Group must transition into an organization that is able to make impartial decisions outside of the national interests of the current co-chairs, United States, France, and Russia, who have been unable to maintain their neutrality in dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and therefore must abdicate their positions. This is not to say that Russia, France, and the U.S. must be completely removed from the negotiation process. The current co-chair nations have a tremendous amount of influence on the leadership of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which can be leveraged to achieve the Minsk Group’s desired goals. However, Russia, France, and the United States can perform monitoring responsibilities and be the primary force providers for the peacekeeping missions in the conflict zone at the direction of another group of co-chairs. In order to inspire a Russian, French, and U.S. active involvement, the introduction of transitioning co-chairs into the strategic environment as mediators must not threaten the interests of the existing players. The transitioning Minsk Group must adhere to a threefold rigid standard.
First, the new co-chairs must be geographically absent from the Caucasus region and demonstrate political neutrality regarding any Armenian or Azeri diasporas within their countries. Such a mandate would effectively eliminate Armenian and Azeri lobbying groups from exerting undue political pressure on the new co-chairs. It is clear that in Russia, the United States, and France the Armenian and Azeri populations influenced and therefore hindered the Minsk Group’s decision-making process.
Second, the elected countries to serve as new co-chair of the Minsk Group must have adequate motivation for achieving regional stability. A peaceful resolution must have promoted stability. The current co-chairs seek strategic advancement by taking advantage of the instability in the region; therefore, a nation that has a limited stake in the region, and perhaps even benefit from ending conflict would be best suited to seek solutions to Nagorno-Karabakh’s status.
Third, the new co-chairs must be chosen from a list of nations that have the respect of Azerbaijani political leaders as well as the key regional players, Russia, and Turkey. Such a combination may seem unrealistic but is required if a permanent solution is to be achieved.
Possible new co-chairs can include China, India, Japan, Canada, Brazil, and Switzerland.
These new Minsk Group co-chairs could bring a new perspective and a fresh outlook on how to resolve the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, while United States, Russia, France, and potentially Turkey and Iran carry out the peacekeeping and monitoring mission on the ground.
This approach also commits the key nations with a direct interest in the region to begin a dialogue on the specifics and number of troops each nation will provide to help guarantee the stability of the region. To bring a lasting solution to this historic conflict however Minsk Group must address the underlining issues.
Minsk Group’s efforts have failed to account for historic factors like the Armenian genocide, which has deep roots extending into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Addressing the single most significant historical event that has shaped the collective memory and identity of the Armenian people for generations can drastically change the course of the conflict. At the same time normalizing the Turkish-Armenian relations will open the borders of Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. The United States can take a leading role in forging peaceful relations between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia.
2) A Legal Crusade: Nagorno-Karabagh Resolution
The recommendation is to tie the recognition of the Armenian genocide into the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution by pressuring US arms manufacturers in court. Since the lack of trust between the two communities stemmed from the association of Azeris to the Ottoman Turks and the genocide, official recognition by the Azerbaijani leadership of the genocide will not only bolster the Armenian and Azerbaijani relations but simultaneously pacify the fears of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. To entice the Azerbaijani government to make such a proclamation, they’d need to feel threatened strategically. One way to do this is by putting direct legal pressure on Azeribejani military contractors in the US through the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), also called the Alien Tort Claims Act. Astghik Hairapetian, JD, from the UCLA Law’s Human Rights Institute, provides an in-depth analysis on how to utilize the ATS and notes “ The ATS is key to disincentivizing corporate behavior that flies in the face of international norms and standards. Its reach must be preserved to make clear to corporate actors that their support of war crimes and crimes against humanity will neither be protected nor tolerated”.
Critics may argue that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has no connection to the genocide issue, but in fact, and quite the contrary, the reluctance of the Armenians to allow Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh has been based on concerns for the security of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.
The United States has an opportunity to help bring these communities together by tackling the questions that have previously been avoided. To get the US to focusing on Truth-telling and reconciliation, going after its Defense Industry under the ATS could be a way for the State Department to make a much larger effort in peacemaking.
As an example, the US-led South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a court-like body in Cape-Town, established in 1995, as a socio-political process to expose human rights abuses carried out by the apartheid regime, allowing victims to testify in public or private hearings which served as a therapeutic function.
This allowed victims to forgive the perpetrators but more importantly allowed the perpetrators to publicly renounce their crimes helping both victim and perpetrator alike to move past the negative historic memories. TRC like a model can be used to begin reconciliation and truth commissions between Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan to address the genocide of 1915 and similar historic events that hold these nations hostage to enmity and collective memories of injustice.
Only by embracing an open reconciliation process between Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, can the United States reclaim its influence and earn authority, by building legitimacy. Influence in the Caucasus is kindled by force, either diplomatic or militaristic.